



Paralyzing Drones via EMI Signal Injection on Sensory Communication Channels

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Drone

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Drone Neutralization Technologies

Туре	Technology	Strength	Weakness	Response Time
Physical	Machine Gun,	Cost	Accuracy, Collateral damage	≈0
	Net, Colliding Drone	Cost	Accuracy, Reload	<10 sec
	Sound	Swarm attack	Distance, Power, Bypass, Aiming	<10 sec
	High-power laser	Accuracy, Distance	Response time, Cost, Swarm	>10 sec
Electro- magnetic	RF jamming	Cost, Distance	Collateral damage, Response time, Bypass	>10 sec
	GNSS jamming	Cost, Distance	Collateral damage, Response time, Bypass	>10 sec
	High-power EM	Swarm, Distance	Cost, Collateral damage	≈0
	Targeted EM	Power, Swarm, Distance	Cost	≈0
Hijacking	GNSS spoofing	Hijacking, Distance	Collateral damage, Response time	<10 sec
	Software hijacking	Cost	Need vulnerability	



Previous Work: Rocking Drone [Usenix'15]

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How Drone Control Works



Control Unit



How Rocking Drone Control Works



Control Unit



Rocking Drone Attack Results



Rotor control data samples



Raw data samples of the gyroscope

Paralyzing Drones with EMI Attack

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Rocking Drone: Control System Perspective



Control Unit



Paralyzing Drone: Control System Perspective



Control Unit



Q1. Distorting Communication Channel?





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Q2. Remote disturbance possible?





Q3. Remote injection possible for drone?

EM injection experiment On hovering Drone



Q4. Attack Frequency?



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Q4. Attack Frequency?

Targeted EMI injection Experiment



Q5. Response time?





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Q6. Countermeasure?

Shielding Evaluation IMU & Wire



Q6. Countermeasure?

- Existing Circuit level Detect and Mitigation
 - Time Offset Approach
 - Dummy Circuits Apporach
- Detection & Recovery
 - Detect the impact of EMI
 - Recover or Replace the impact of EMI
- Shielding [Most Effective]
 - Block the injection rather than the impact of EMI



Conclusion

- Advantages of Paralyzing Drones
 - The attack frequency is determined by the main board \rightarrow Swarming
 - Very narrow frequency → lesser collateral damage, lesser power
 - Within a single sampling time \rightarrow no time for detect and recovery
- Future work (commercialize)
 - Analysis of countermeasures
 - Analysis with more drones
 - Analysis for more efficient and effective EMI injection





Thank you!

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https://sites.google.com/view/paralyzing-drones-via-emi





How is this Working

- 1. Back door EMI coupling(Radiative) on Control unit
- 2. Signal distortion in the digital signal of the communication channels between the IMU and control unit.





POE (Point of Entry)







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POE (Point of Entry)





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Experiment Setup



